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UNITED STATES DISTRICT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NE		FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE U.S. DISTRICT COURT E.D.N.Y.	
UNITED STATES OF AMERIC	CA,	JUL 1 1 2008 ★	
	04 cr 706	BROOKLYN OFFICE	
versus		United States Courthouse 225 Cadman Plaza Hast	
ABUBAKR RAHEEM,	Brooklyn, N.Y.		
DEFENDA	NT.		
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	Ju	ne 10th, 2008	
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Before: HON. MAGISTRAT		•	
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    by CAT.
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LISA SCHMID, CCR, RMR OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER

1 letter?

MR. LEVITT: Well, I think that this is an issue that should be addressed, frankly, before Judge Trager. I know in order to make a motion for reconsideration, it is necessary to bring to the Court's attention something which it should have considered pursuant to the government's arguments, but did not -- or some kind of new law.

And really, all the government is saying is, we want to make these arguments again, and now we have done some research, so we want to rely on a case, United States versus Brown, where the Court -- the Second Circuit simply said it was not an abuse of discretion to find that the government's challenge to a particular juror was not pretextual under certain facts which are much different than these facts.

I mean, there, you had a juror who demonstrably was actively involved in a church. He was going to meetings several times a year or some such thing. There was no rebuttal by the defense to that argument made by the prosecutor.

There were two arguments made by the prosecutor. The defense attorney had grounds -- only rebutted one. It didn't even address the second one, with respect to the level of religious participation, which was something that the Second Circuit pointed out, and obviously relied upon in finding there was no abuse of discretion.

That's completely different than this case. First

there is nothing here that suggests that same level of involvement by Juror Number 1. Number two, it's something that we absolutely did address. And number three, the other distinctions that were made in Brown between that juror and other jurors, and whether or not they exercised peremptory challenges, those situations don't exist in this case. So it's a completely different set of facts as to the abuse of discretion standards, so it's just not the same case. It's not the same facts. It's not even the same application of the law.

So most respectfully, I'd ask that the Court simply adhere to its previous decision. The government has presented absolutely nothing. They had every opportunity to ask the Court to ask additional questions besides the one single question that they wanted the Court to ask.

The juror answered all the questions satisfactory.

There's not a hint of suggestion that this juror is unable or unwilling to follow the Court's instructions concerning how to decide the case, and therefore, the Court should adhere to its previous decision. If they want to appeal, then obviously, that's their business.

THE COURT: Mr. Loonam?

MR. LOONAM: Yes, Your Honor.

It seems that the law was a little unclear when we were going through each challenge in the back as to what role religion could play in consideration, and it's hard to make

those decisions on the fly. So the government's presenting Your Honor with an opportunity to look at the law and consider the facts that we presented, in light of that law now.

And we have -- we did ask for further questions on the religious issue. We had to deal with the information that we were given at the time.

We had an agent who expressed a strong view that this particular church, there may be issues with government involvement and government conflict, not only with the David Koresh issue, but this agent, his reasons were so strong because he was based out of Kansas City, and served process on the Adventist Church, the Seventh Day Adventist Church. And they didn't even recognize his authority. They said, "Across this line, this is not United States territory, once you cross the line."

So the basis for this was legitimate, in light of the case law. And taken into account with all the other reasons given with the information we had, this was a legitimate challenge. And so, the government moves for reconsideration.

But also, requests, you know, a finding that Your Honor didn't find the pretext on the race challenge, that this -- that we gave honest answers as to our reasons, which were religious-oriented, in addition to disposition-oriented. And it's our position that those reasons are legitimate constitutional reasons. The fact that it was -- the standard

of review doesn't affect whether it's a constitutional challenge or not. If it was an unconstitutional challenge on those reasons, no matter what the standard was, the Court would have overruled the lower court. And so, the government is moving for reconsideration, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. I've heard enough. Thank you.

The decision here is a little difficult for me, because the government did ask me to pursue a line of questioning which may have revealed more information that would provide a proper basis for the challenge.

Let me start by saying that the motions for reconsideration are indeed governed by the standard that the Court is to grant them only if there is some controlling issue, a controlling law that's brought to the Court's attention.

The Court was unaware of or if there is something -some fact that the Court overlooked, then it was properly
presented -- that was presented to the Court, just overlooked
in its determination. So there are no controlling issues, no
controlling decisions of law here that are brought to my
attention. And the facts that were brought to my attention in
the letter were indeed facts argued, so I don't think there is
a proper basis for the motion.

The government has educated me now as to inquiries I should have made or should have permitted, because the distinction that I understand in the cases with mespect to

challenges based on religion is -- or at least the cases cited by the Court -- is that you may not discriminate in jury selection on the basis of religious affiliation, but you may discriminate or the basis of religious belief.

I don't think we have a record here about whether Ms. Fordice's beliefs would prevent her from being a fair and impartial juror. We do know she is a Seventh Day Adventist. This is a simply a religious affiliation. And as a consequence, because I did not go further -- even though the government did ask about that -- I we don't know whether her religious belief, whether it's simply a religious belief or religious affiliation -- let me -- that's not phrased right.

We don't know whether she has a religious belief that would prevent her from serving. She certainly answered all the questions about her service to indicate otherwise.

So had the government -- and I don't fault the government for this -- but had the government made a stronger case for pushing for questions about this area during the questioning process, and had brought to my attention the issues and framed them in the way that they are now framed in this letter, I would reconsider my ruling about whether to pursue the questions, but we're past that now.

And while I'm reluctant to -- well, the government certainly makes a powerful argument now, that the decision is not a pretext for -- I mean, the challenge is not -- was not

9 based on their pretext for racial discrimination. 1 I'm not sure it gets past the religious discrimination problem that we have 2 now or -- that is posed by this set of issues. 3 4 So, it's fair ground for appeal, but I am -- at this point, am not -- I don't think that I have a basis to 5 reconsider the ruling, the proper basis to reconsider the 6 ruling, so I'll adhere to it. 7 8 And of course, you have a fair ground for appeal, and it not an abuse of discretion standard. I think this is 9 something that's de novo review, so --10 11 MR. LOONAM: (Nods head affirmatively.) 12 THE COURT: We don't have Judge Trager's clerk, so I don't know when those issues are going to be raised. 13 14 Have you heard anything about that, counsel --15 MR. LEVITT: No, Your Honor. 16 THE COURT: -- about the appeals? 17 MR. LOONAM: No, Your Honor. 18 THE COURT: All right. Here is the way I think that we'll proceeded today, and I'm certainly happy to hear from you 19 20 about any thoughts you have. We, at this moment, we have 16 jurors who are qualified or, you know, that were selected, 21 subject to the challenges, and we have to pick four alternate 22 23 jurors. 24 I think that what we'll do is go through the process I anticipate at the outset, that is, seat eight, and ask all the 25

questions that we would ask of jurors in order to qualify them for cause, but then not go through the strikes because depending on how Judge Trager rules on the objections or the Batson challenges. It may be that people will be reseated, which will free up some of the 16 who are now part of the initial 16 chosen to be replacement jurors. And they would be the original four replacement jurors -- if you follow what I'm saying. In other words, they should be a part of the panel, it seems to me, to be part of the replacement jurors.

Now, Judge Trager's clerk is on his way, I'm told.

So it struck me that those persons, you know, should be -- if any of the 16 who were not discharged yesterday that -- let's put it that way -- are available for replacement duty service, they rightly would be in the group to be considered as part of the replacement panel. So, we'd -- but that would mean that we'd have extras from the eight additional.

Now, maybe I'm overcomplicating this, and I'll hear you, but that seemed to me to be the most consistent with the overall jury venire and the random selection of jurors that is contemplated.

Did does everybody follow what I'm saying?

MR. LOONAM: Not exactly, Your Honor. But, actually to clarify at least the numbers, I believe yesterday, defense counsel said they were going to think about which of Your

Honor's holdings that were going to appeal, if any. Then they would determine which of the jurors we hold as replacement jurors -- I guess replacement jurors. So maybe we'll start there.

THE COURT: Well, that's fair enough. I take it you intend to appeal on Ms. Fordice?

MR. LOONAM: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. So if you prevail, then -- and you prevail on the others, as well -- I'll find out from Mr. Levitt if he intends to appeal those others as well -- then we'll have -- Juror Number 28 would be seated, Mr. Rothwell, and then we would need all eight of the replacement jurors from whom to select.

Now, on the other hand, if you lose and Mr. Levitt wins on the other three, then we would have four potential replacement jurors who are part of the 16 who are here now. If you -- because there would be a total of four strikes that you had which were disregarded, leaving four additional. You follow the math?

MR. LOONAM: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So Mr. Levitt, so the government suggested that I determine, before we go too far in counting up -- in doing the math, whether and how many, if you do, intend to -- whether you intend the appeal and if so, how many you intend to ask Judge Trager to review?

1 MR. LEVITT: To the extent the government appeals the Court's ruling with respect to Juror Number 1 we will appeal 2 the Court's ruling with respect to Jurors Number 10, 11 and 17. 3 4 THE COURT: Okay. So that puts all of those four in Do you understand the process --5 play. 6 MR. LEVITT: Yes. 7 THE COURT: -- that I'm proposing? MR. LEVITT: As I understand it, we're going to 8 qualify the necessary number, so they're there if we need them. 9 10 THE COURT: Right. And then you exercise the challenges against the eight lowest numbers -- let's call it 11 that -- who are available as replacements. 12 13 MR. LEVITT: By the way, are we doing that now? 14 THE COURT: No. No. We're waiting until Judge Trager issues his rulings. You get all the information you need once 15 he gives you the rulings, then we'll know and you'll know how 16 many -- I mean, you'll know who to strike from, put it that 17 way. Does that make sense to you? 18 MR. LEVITT: Sure. MR. LOONAM: Yes. I think we need to ask about a transcript in order to get this done today, otherwise, jurors are going to be sticking around for an extended period. THE COURT: Well, we're not going -- they don't even need to be here for you to make your decisions. I'd like to just get them questioned, get them out of here this morning.

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1 MR. LOONAM: If it's a de novo review, Judge Trager may make an additional factual record. 2 3 THE COURT: Okay. But is -- Judge Trager's clerk is here. I can consult with him. 4 5 Do you know how Judge Trager intends to proceed with respect to the appeal on the Batson issues? 6 7 THE CLERK: I haven't had a chance to talk to him since yesterday around four. So he isn't even aware there's a 8 Batson challenge on appeal. I'll call him right now. 9 10 THE COURT: So the issue that the government is raising is whether Judge Trager would be -- whether there's a 11 possibility Judge Trager would, in order to decide the appeals, 12 seek a further factual record by inquiring of the jurors, I 13 14 presume? 15 MR. LOONAM: That's correct, Your Honor. 16 THE COURT: Ezra, why don't you call tim? 17 But that, it seems to me -- I'd ask you to do that -but it seems to me it only would apply to the four challenges. 18 19 MR. LOONAM: That's correct. 20 THE COURT: So we don't need to keep the rest of them 21 around. 22 MR. LOONAM: Indeed. I think it would probably just apply to the government's -- to Juror Number 1, on this 23 24 religious --25 THE COURT: I don't know. A further factual record,

too? I don't know -- or you may seek it, I don't know. To the extent that de novo review means that Judge Trager has the -- I hate to say right -- but it's available to him to conduct further factual inquiry. He could decide to conduct a factual inquiry as to all four. So we'll find out.

But in the meantime -- in the meantime, I think we ought to just go ahead and seat eight. As to the others --

(Discussion off the record.)

THE COURT: Go back on the record. We're all right. We're going to go get the rest of the venire, as well as the people who are selected yesterday.

This is what I propose. We're just going to tell the 16 who are left yesterday with numbers, we're going to conduct them to the jury room and let them fill out the necessary forms.

And it strikes me that we can release all but the four -- but then it sort of suggests to me that that's going to focus attention on those four, and they're going to wonder why they're the ones that have to stick around.

MR. D'ALESSANDRO: Judge, maybe what we can do is while they're in the back filling out the form, it will give us time to hear back from Judge Trager.

THE COURT: Yes. I agree. So for the time being, we'll wait and see what Judge Trager has to say about that issue.

But in the mean time, I'm not going to ask them to sit here while we go through the rest of the jury selection. They can just retire to the jury room.

MS. STERNHEIM: Your Honor, is it your intention to keep all of them? Because I'm concerned that they're going to be singled out, the four. They're the only African Americans on the panel.

THE COURT: That's what I was saying. We're not going to discharge anybody right now. I'm not going to send anybody away right now. And if there's an additional factual record to be made, it's going to be readily apparent who is asked questions of.

MS. STERNHEIM: I understand.

THE COURT: So, I mean, we'll cross that bridge when we come to it, but it's something that we need to be aware of, and I appreciate that.

Okay. Are there any other issues, by the way, to address before we go further this morning?

MR. D'ALESSANDRO: Judge, something to keep in the back of our mind. I don't want to be in a situation like this tomorrow, since we're scheduled for opening statements.

It seems to me if we move for cause, and we have our eight, then we go through or peremptories, and then if they are excused before we have this articulated record there may be further Batson challenges. We're going to have to call them

back. So I would -- I wouldn't excuse the eight until we have had the appeal through with Judge Trager, because at that point, we're going to be doing the peremptories. I maybe articulating something the Court already had in mind. THE COURT: I didn't, but I think I understand what you're saying, and we'll see what -- we'll see how -- what we need to do. MR. D'ALESSANDRO: Thank you. THE COURT: It may be that Judge Trager won't have the opportunity to deal with any of this until tomorrow, in which case we can let everybody go, and they would come back tomorrow and this will be item number one on the menu tomorrow. (Recess.)